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Abstract 
Many studies show that political participation at the individual level is fragmented, 
multidimensional and non-cumulative, but comparison of 22 nations in Europe shows that 
different kinds of social and political participation at the country level are cumulative, 
unidimensional. The result is a set of country families of participation. Since these 
generally correspond with the country families found in studies of public policy, it raises 
the possibility of still higher-level generalizations covering an even broader range of 
social, economic, and political country characteristics. Finally, this study explores various 
theories explaining country patterns and families of participation and concludes that this is 
best done by a reference to a single syndrome of country characteristics covering 
democratic and economic development, government effectiveness, low corruption, high 
public expenditure on public personal services, and the rule of law. These factors seem to 
act as a mutually reinforcing system of cause and effects that are closely associated with 
country levels of participation of many different kinds. 
Kurzzusammenfassung 
Während viele Studien auf der Individualebene eine fragmentierte, mehrdimensionale und 
nicht-kumulative Struktur politischer Partizipation aufzeigen, kommt dieser Vergleich von 
22 Nationen Europas auf der Makroebene zum Ergebnis, dass verschiedene Formen 
politischer und sozialer Beteiligung sowohl kumulativ als auch eindimensional sind. So 
können im Hinblick auf die Partizipation Länderfamilien definiert werden. Da diese 
weitgehend mit jenen Länderfamilien übereinstimmen, die sich aus anderen Studien 
ergeben haben, eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit einer weiter reichenden Generalisierung, die 
vielfältige soziale, ökonomische und politische Ländercharakteristika umfasst. Darüber 
hinaus werden verschiedene theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von Ländergruppen und 
Partizipationsmustern überprüft mit dem Ergebnis, dass dies am besten mit einem Netz eng 
verwandter Indikatoren gelingt, namentlich der demokratischen und ökonomischen 
Entwicklung, der Regierungseffizienz, niedriger Korruption, hohen öffentlichen Ausgaben 
in den Bereichen Bildung und Gesundheit sowie Rechtstaatlichkeit. Diese Faktoren bilden 
ein sich gegenseitig verstärkendes System von Ursache und Wirkung, das in einer engen 
Verknüpfung mit dem Ausmaß an Beteiligung in verschiedenen Bereichen steht. 
 

Kenneth Newton and Heiko Giebler1  
Patterns of Participation:  
Political and Social Participation in 22 Nations 
‘… nothing is great or little otherwise than by comparison …’ 
(Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels) 
Introduction 
This study explores cross-national patterns of participation in 22 nations in Western and 
Central Europe and tries to explain them. It differs from most previous work on 
participation in two main respects. First, much of the existing literature deals with either 
social participation or political participation, and often concentrates on particular sub-
types such as conventional political participation, protest activity, political violence, 
membership of voluntary associations, or engagement in community affairs. This study 
examines levels of participation across a wide variety of different types – political and 
social, conventional and unconventional, formal and informal, individual and collective. 
Second, most research examines individual-level participation, comparing the activity of 
different groups according to variables such as age, sex, occupation, education, ethnicity, 
and family background. In contrast, this study is a cross-national comparative analysis of 
aggregate rates of participation. Countries, not individuals, are the units of analysis. 
There is no necessary reason why patterns of participation at the individual level should 
be repeated at the country level, although this may be the case, and certainly no reason 
why the same sorts of variables used to explain participation at the individual should be 
used at the country level of analysis (Roller and Weßels 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993; Weßels 1997). For this reason the main focus of explanation here is on the 
systemic and institutional characteristics of countries, such as democratic and economic 
development, public policies and services, and the rules and procedures of the social and 
political order. 
The study is divided into two main parts. The first shows that patterns of individual-level 
participation revealed by earlier research are, indeed, repeated in this study, but it then 
explores country levels of participation in greater detail and shows them to be very 
different. The second part of the paper explores theories that might account for these 
                                                 
1  The authors would like to thank Frank Castles, Jan van Deth, and Bernhard Weßels for their very helpful 
comments on an earlier version of the paper. 
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patterns of participation, and, since the concern is with country comparisons, the 
explanatory theories and variables are necessarily systemic and institutional ones that 
characterize whole nations, not individuals.  
Political Participation: Specialized or Generalized? 
Verba and Nie’s (1972) classic work on political participation in the United States found, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom of the time, that political participation is not one-
dimensional and cumulative, but fragmented and specialized. Most citizens tend to 
specialize in a particular form of political engagement and stick to it: they are either party 
campaigners, or involved in community affairs, or they contact public officials, or they are 
protest activists. Comparatively few engage in a wide range of political activities and most 
do not accumulate different activities in the political repertoire as they become more and 
more politically involved. If they do combine two or more kinds of political activity, it is 
not possible to predict on the basis of knowledge of any one kind of activity what the 
others are likely to be. In this sense, different kinds of political participation are 
multidimensional and non-cumulative. The Verba and Nie finding has been amply 
confirmed in later studies of political participation in Costa Rica, Canada, Norway, Tokyo, 
Britain, and the United States (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978: 
331−339).  
This article takes the fragmented and specialized nature of political participation as its 
starting point, but extends the analysis to cover a wide range of both political and social 
participation. In addition to conventional and protest political activity it covers social 
involvement, helping behavior, and participation of various kinds in a broad array of 
voluntary associations. The present work also takes countries as its unit of analysis, not 
individuals. That is, it uses country averages of different kinds of social and political 
participation in order to see how they compare and contrast. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978: 
61−62) found that each of the seven countries covered in their comparative study had its 
own particular profile of political participation that differed from the rest. As a result, each 
country had a unique pattern of participation, and they explain this by suggesting that 
different types of political systems will encourage various types and combinations of 
political engagement according to the needs and problems of their citizens and according 
to their perceptions of the most effective forms of action for solving these problems. 
Other research also suggests diverse patterns of participation among countries. Lipset 
(1963), for example, argues that each country’s political history is associated with a culture 
that is more or less individualist or collectivist, while other writers emphasize the 
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importance of religion (Scott 1957), urban-rural differences (Smith 1975), government 
structures (Rose 1954), contextual factors of opportunity structures and modernization 
(Roller and Weßels 1996), and of age, education, and wealth (Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 
1992; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Knoke 1986; Morales 2008). For 
example, it may be that federal systems favor more decentralized and local forms of 
participation, that strong and unified parties encourage party activity, that proportional 
electoral systems encourage high levels of voting turnout, that competitive market societies 
have more occupational pressure group activity, and so on. In this case, each country with 
its own particular historical, institutional, and cultural mix will have its own particular, and 
perhaps unique, pattern of social and political participation.  
It is also possible that rates of participation are determined primarily by one or a few 
driving factors with a powerful influence. Van Deth and Elff’s (2004) multi-national 
analysis of changes in political involvement and apathy in Europe in the last three decades 
shows that political interest depends primarily on economic changes. Is it possible that 
economic development–or some other variable such as religion, democratic development, 
or education–has a powerful and general influence on many forms of participation? This 
would have two implications for cross-national comparative studies. First, countries with 
similar levels of economic development would have similar levels of participation of 
different kinds, rather than unique country profiles. Second, if, as is often the case, 
economic development has a powerful and general effect on a wide variety of social and 
political phenomena, including different forms of social and political participation, in a 
wide variety of countries, one would expect to find not a fragmented and multidimensional 
pattern of participation at the national level but a unidimensional and cumulative pattern 
determined by one or a few country characteristics.  
Data and Methods  
Data on social and political participation are drawn from the first wave of the European 
Social Survey (ESS) of 2002/2003. The ESS survey has a methodological rigor that is 
unusually strict for comparative surveys. Each participating nation has to adhere to 
common standards of sampling, questionnaire design, event and context measurements, 
translation, fieldwork, response rates, and archiving. Any deviations from these 
specifications are documented and transparent. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with a sample of people aged 15 and over resident in private households, regardless of 
nationality, citizenship, or legal status. Sampling was by strict probability methods at every 
stage. Quota sampling was not permitted at any level, nor was the substitution of non-
4 
responding households or individuals.2 Response rates of 65% or higher were attained in 
11 of the 22 countries and in many cases were hence in excess of the usual response rates 
for cross-national surveys and even national ones. Sample numbers were between 2,995 
(Germany) and 1,207 (Italy).3  
Great care was taken with drafting (see Saris, Satorra, and Coenders 2004), pilot testing, 
and translation of the questionnaire into all languages spoken as a first language by 5% or 
more of the resident population of all countries. Most national surveys were conducted 
between September 2002 and April 2003.4 The ESS asks 24 questions about different 
aspects of social and political participation. These group into five different types, as 
follows:  
1. Conventional political participation 
The measures of conventional political participation are the percentages of respondents 
in each country saying that they had engaged in the following seven activities during 
the last twelve months: voting; involvement in political campaigns; contacting political 
and government officials; joining, working for, and giving money to political 
organizations; being interested in politics; and discussing politics. 
2. Unconventional (protest) political behavior 
Unconventional political behavior in this study means taking part in the previous 
twelve months in any one of four forms of protest activity; lawful demonstrations, 
signing a petition, boycotting products, and deliberately buying certain products for 
political, ethical, or environmental reasons. Legal protest behavior of this kind has 
become part of the normal repertoire of western politics in recent decades, though only 
a minority engage in it in most Western states (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jennings and 
van Deth 1990; Meyer 2004). Illegal protest behavior is less common but by no means 
negligible (Roller and Weßels 1996: 98).  
3. Participation in voluntary associations  
The ESS asks about four kinds of activity in voluntary associations in the previous 
twelve months; membership of, participation in, giving money to, and voluntary work 
for associations. It also asks about 11 kinds of voluntary associations (business, 
consumer, cultural, environmental, humanitarian, political, religious, science, social, 
                                                 
2  Over-sampling (by using different selection probabilities for certain subgroups or strata) was acceptable 
provided that the total sample still complied with the effective sample size criterion and that the data 
could be re-weighted to achieve a correct distribution. 
3  Design weights and population weights are applied as appropriate in all the statistics reported in this 
paper. 
4   Full details of the first wave survey are available in the ESS Technical Annex 
(www.europeansocialsurvey.org). Data can be downloaded by accessing the ESS Data homepage 
(http://ess.nsd.uib.no). 
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sport, and trade union).5 Unfortunately, questions about voluntary activity were not 
asked in Switzerland and the Czech Republic reducing the number of countries to 20 so 
far as voluntary associations are concerned. These two countries are included in 
percentage tables dealing with other forms of participation but not in the voluntary 
organization tables or (for reasons of comparability) in the tables presenting or using 
standardized participation scores for countries.  
4. Informal social participation 
The measure of social engagement is the percentage of respondents saying that they 
meet socially and the frequency with which they say they do so. It differs from 
involvement in voluntary associations in that it concerns individual and group 
participation, not that of organizations and associations.  
5. Informal helping behavior  
The measure of helping behavior is the percentage declaring that they have actively 
provided help for others and the frequency with which they say they do so. It differs 
from the activity of welfare associations in being individual and personal, rather than 
organized and institutionalized by a charitable association.  
The number of countries included in the ESS is too small to use multiple correlations, 
multiple regression, or principal component analysis. Using the latter would make this 
study directly comparable with individual level research, but, unfortunately, the sample 
size fails to meet widely recognized standards, for example, the rule of thumb requiring 
five times as many observations as variables in principle component analysis (Bryant and 
Yarnold 1995: 100). Therefore, a combination of percentages, simple correlations, and 
hierarchical cluster analysis is used instead. None of these three methods is likely to 
produce entirely convincing results on its own but using all three together is more 
convincing if they triangulate on the same general conclusions.  
Cluster analysis is commonly used in attempts to discover similarities between countries 
where the number of observations is substantially lower than in individual level research 
(Castles 1993; Obinger and Wagschal 2001; Castles and Obinger 2008). In this study, 
cluster analysis is used to uncover similarities and dissimilarities between different 
measures of participation as well as to uncover similarities and differences between 
measures of participation in different countries or, in other words, to identify country 
families. This makes it possible to analyze the way in which different measures of 
participation cluster and the ways in which different countries cluster with respect to 
participation. The cluster analysis technique applied here is hierarchical cluster analysis 
                                                 
5   There is also an ‘Other’ category which is not analysed here because it is a mixed residual category with 
an unclear content.  
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with the complete linkage method using Euclidian distances. The complete linkage 
method is a rigorous and exacting procedure in the formation of clusters, sometimes 
described as the ‘furthest-neighbor’ approach. It is a less biased method than some other 
forms of cluster analysis (Hair and Black 2000: 178). The inclusion of a new object or 
cluster into an existing cluster is based on the maximum distance between objects in each 
cluster and represents the smallest space that can enclose all objects in the newly formed 
cluster. Because cluster analysis maximizes the distance between clusters and minimizes 
the distance within them, the complete linkage method tends to form especially tight 
clusters.6  
Euclidean distance is based on the calculation of distance between two variables in n-
dimensional space, where n equals the number of variables. Euclidean distance is the most 
commonly used measure applied in cluster analysis and is particularly appropriate for the 
purposes of this article (Cormack 1971).7 The sensitivity of the measures to absolute scale 
differences (voting turnout average 79%, working for a political party or group averages 
4%), is solved by using standardized data (Hair and Black 2000: 171).  
Individual-Level Political Participation 
Although the concern is with cross-national comparison in this article, individual level 
analysis was carried out as an essential but preliminary step in order to confirm that the 
ESS produces the same or similar results as previous individual-level studies cited above. 
Table 1, presenting the results for the United Kingdom, shows that it does. Using the same 
statistical method of principal component analysis to analyze very similar measures of 
conventional participation as the Verba and Nie studies, the table shows that political 
participation in the United Kingdom divides into four distinct components, each of which 
is small and independent of the others. The first explains only 17% of the variance and 
loads heavily on working for a political organization, displaying campaign material, taking 
part in demonstrations, and donating money to political organizations or groups. The 
second, explaining less than 16%, covers the unconventional or protest behavior of signing 
petitions, boycotting products, and buying ethical products. The third, explaining less than 
                                                 
6   Since the results of different kinds of cluster analysis can vary, iterative partitioning methods using K-
means cluster analysis were also calculated. The results, not produced here for reasons of space, are 
virtually identical to those of the hierarchical cluster analysis. 
7   It is vital to give a wide variety of participation measures equal importance in the calculations, and 
Euclidian distances gives outliers neither too much (Squared Euclidean distances) nor little weight (City-
block distances). It is also vital to give every feature of an object equal importance for the calculations, 
excluding, for example, Chebychev or Power distances, and Euclidian distance is the most satisfactory 
way of doing this. 
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15%, covers interest in and discussion of politics, and the smallest of all is associated only 
with voting. All four components together explain little more than half of the total 
variance. These results repeat previous research showing that individual political 
participation is typically fragmented and multidimensional.8  
 
Table 1: Principal component analysis (varimax rotation) of individual political 
participation in the United Kingdom (N = 2,052)  
Component Indicator 
1 2 3 4 
Interested in politics 0.130 0.131 0.812 −0.203 
Discuss politics 0.081 0.211 0.814 −0.031 
Voted in last election −0.012 −0.080 −0.172 0.939 
Contacted politician 0.374 0.160 0.332 0.023 
Worked for political organization 0.691 −0.021 0.166 0.127 
Displayed campaign material 0.670 0.154 −0.036 −0.181 
Lawful demonstration 0.631 0.108 −0.016 −0.056 
Donated money to political organization 0.499 0.096 0.234 0.040 
Signed petition 0.293 0.606 0.008 −0.191 
Boycotted products 0.055 0.793 0.173 −0.019 
Bought ethical products 0.070 0.764 0.254 0.039 
Variance explained (%) 16.65 15.62 14.92 9.24 
 
The same principle component analysis of individual political participation in France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Denmark shows the same degree of fragmentation and 
specialization.9 Having established this consistency with previous individual-level results, 
the rest of the analysis will be devoted to aggregate, cross-national levels of participation. Is 
it also fragmented and multidimensional, and does each country have its own unique profile 
of participation?  
                                                 
8   The rarest form of political activity is illegal protest. Although the ESS asks about it, it was decided not 
to include it as a form of participation in this study. While it is clearly a form of political participation, it 
was excluded from this study on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, its illegal nature sets it 
apart from the other 24 measures of legal participation, and, empirically, it is the rarest form of 
participation with no more than 2% in any country saying they had been involved in this kind of activity, 
and usually less than 1%. In individual-level principal component analysis it emerges as a variable on its 
own that fails to explain a significant proportion of the variance. Illegal protest activity is, therefore, an 
exception to the general rule of participation but a rare one.  
9   Figures are not reproduced here for reasons of space. 
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Cross-National Participation 
Conventional Political Participation 
Table 2 presents the measures of conventional political participation by country. Because 
the table contains an overwhelming mass of figures, it is organized in a way that helps to 
make comparative sense of them. First, types of participation are arranged in columns on 
the y-axis from the most widespread forms of activity on the left (voting and discussing 
politics) to the least widespread on the right (working for a political party and donating 
money to a political organization). Second, countries are ranked in rows on the x-axis from 
top to bottom according to their overall standardized rates of participation.10 The basis for 
this ranking is explained later in this article, and is not important at this stage of the 
analysis; it is the simple rank ordering of countries that matters at this stage (see Table 7).  
Table 2 shows substantial variations in different kinds of conventional political 
participation. The over-all averages of voting in elections and discussing politics are, not 
surprisingly, the most widespread forms of political activity, with 79% and 66% 
respectively, and donating money and working for a party or political group the least with 
6% and 4%. In this respect, most countries repeat a common pattern. There are some 
substantial variations between countries within the columns. In Switzerland 85% of the 
population claims to discuss politics often, compared with 50% in Greece. In the 
Netherlands 66% claim an interest in politics, but in Spain it is 21%. In Finland 24% say 
they have contacted a political official in the past twelve months compared with 10% in 
Poland.  
In spite of this, countries tend to vary in the same way both across the columns and 
down them. That is to say, the percentage figures most generally decline as one moves 
across the columns from high participation elections to comparatively low participation 
party work, and the figures most generally decline as one moves down each column. This 
means that if a country is relatively high on one measure it is generally high on the others 
as well. For example, the top seven countries (Norway, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands) most generally have scores that are greater than 
the average of all 22 countries, shown in the last row. In fact, 39 out of 49 scores for the 
top seven are greater than the average. Conversely, the bottom seven countries (Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Slovenia) are often below average.  
The exception to this general pattern is voting turnout. Voting is by far the most 
common form of participation, social or political perhaps because the state, political 
                                                 
10  Except Switzerland and the Czech Republic which are presented at the bottom of the table due to 
missing data on participation in voluntary associations.  
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parties, the media, and some voluntary organizations give elections a lot of attention and 
try to make it as easy as possible to vote. The state makes it simple or automatic to register. 
It subsidizes political parties and their newspapers in some countries, and in five of the 
twenty two countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Greece) voting is 
or has recently been compulsory. The strenuous efforts of parties to mobilize their voters 
are reinforced by some voluntary associations, and elections get a huge amount of media 
coverage. In short, voting is different because electoral systems and political institutions 
help to make it a low cost, low effort form of participation.11
 
Table 2: Participation in seven kinds of conventional political activities by country 
(percentages)a 
Type of political activity Country 
Voted in last 
election 
Discussed 
politics 
Interested in 
politics 
Contacted 
politician 
Displayed 
campaign 
material 
Donated 
money 
Worked for 
political party 
or group 
N 
Norway 84 78 49 23 22 12 9 2,036 
Austria 88 77 58 18 8 11 10 2,257 
Sweden 87 70 57 16 11 6 5 1,999 
Denmark 94 77 63 18 5 9 4 1,506 
Germany 85 82 63 13 6 9 4 2,919 
Finland 82 77 46 24 16 7 3 2,000 
Netherlands 86 71 66 14 4 8 3 2,364 
Belgium 85 60 45 18 7 9 5 1,899 
United Kingdom 72 62 52 18 20 8 3 2,052 
Israel 79 75 63 13 12 12 6 2,499 
Luxembourg 65 69 43 18 5 15 4 1,552 
Ireland 76 60 47 22 9 10 5 2,046 
France 75 74 40 18 11 3 5 1,503 
Slovenia 80 60 42 12 2 6 4 1,519 
Spain 78 53 21 12 10 5 6 1,729 
Portugal 73 65 36 12 7 4 4 1,511 
Italy 89 52 33 12 7 3 3 1,207 
Poland 66 68 40 10 3 9 3 2,110 
Hungary 81 69 46 15 3 2 3 1,685 
Greece 91 50 32 15 3 2 5 2,566 
Switzerland 69 85 61 17 9 18 8 2,040 
Czech Republic 66 66 32 23 5 12 5 1,360 
Average  79 66 45 14 7 6 4 42,359 
a  In this table (and in Tables 3, 4, and 5) the base numbers include ‘Don’t know’, ‘Not answered’ and ‘Refusal.’ 
Country statistics are weighted by country specific design weights, which correct for differential selection 
probabilities and the effects of clustering in the different national sample designs. In the last row of this table, and in 
all following tables where appropriate, the data are weighted by country specific design weights, and also by 
population weights that correct for the different population sizes of countries. 
 
                                                 
11  On the exceptional nature of voting see Schlozman (2002: 436). 
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Unconventional Politics 
Table 3 presents figures for rates of unconventional political participation in the 22 ESS 
countries. It is organized in the same way as Table 2, that is, from the most frequent form of 
protest activity in the first column to the least frequent in the last, and from the country with 
the highest overall rate of social and political participation in the first row to the country 
with the lowest in the last. By and large, Table 3 demonstrates the same general pattern as 
Table 2: the top seven countries generally (in 20 cases out of 28 or 71%) have higher than 
average rates of petition signing, buying ethical products, demonstrating, and boycotting 
products. Conversely, the bottom seven countries most usually (26 cases out of 28 or 93%) 
have lower than average rates of participation.  
 
Table 3: Participation in four kinds of political protest activities by country (percentages) 
Type of political participation Country 
Signed 
petition 
Bought ethical 
products 
Boycotted 
products 
Lawful 
demonstration 
N 
Norway 36 35 19 8 2,036 
Austria 27 30 22 10 2,257 
Sweden 41 55 32 6 1,999 
Denmark 28 44 23 8 1,506 
Germany 30 39 26 11 2,919 
Finland 24 42 27 2 2,000 
Netherlands 22 26 10 3 2,364 
Belgium 34 27 13 8 1,899 
United Kingdom 40 32 26 4 2,052 
Israel 18 18 15 10 2,499 
Luxembourg 29 30 16 21 1,552 
Ireland 28 25 14 7 2,046 
France 35 28 27 18 1,503 
Slovenia 12 10 5 3 1,519 
Spain 24 12 8 17 1,729 
Portugal 7 7 3 4 1,511 
Italy 17 7 8 11 1,207 
Poland 7 10 4 1 2,110 
Hungary 4 10 5 4 1,685 
Greece 5 7 9 5 2,566 
Switzerland 39 45 31 8 2,040 
Czech Republic 16 23 11 5 1,360 
Average 26 24 17 9 42,359 
 
Taking part in lawful demonstrations, however, is clearly an exception to the general rule. 
This is probably because demonstrating is a comparatively high cost/low participation 
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activity that involves small proportions of the population (less than 9% compared with 
26% who sign petitions and even 79% who vote). In other words, the extreme cases of low 
cost/high participation voting and high cost/low participation demonstrations are both poor 
predictors of other forms of political activity.  
It might be hypothesized that the newer democracies with less effective and well 
established channels for conventional political participation will engage in more 
unconventional politics, but the figures in Table 3 suggest otherwise. It is the older and 
better established democracies of northern Europe that generally have the highest rates of 
protest activity. These figures are consistent with post-materialist theory arguing that 
unconventional and lawful forms of protest activity are usually higher in the older and 
wealthier democracies (Inglehart 1997: 312−325; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Participation in Voluntary Associations 
Although most research treats political participation in isolation from social participation, 
it may be that politics do not stand alone. If social and political patterns are closely 
associated, as van Deth (1997) argues, then there will be a single socio-political pattern of 
participation. Indeed, social capital and civic society theories argue that the higher the rates 
of civic and social engagement, the higher political participation is likely to be. If this is 
the case, then voluntary association activity should follow the pattern already seen in the 
case of political participation. At the same time, there are reasons for thinking that 
countries might combine their levels of voluntary activity in their own unique ways: some 
countries are religious with a high church membership; some are more sporty than others; 
the egalitarian ones will encourage minority group activity and show fewer class 
differences; socialist countries are likely to have strong trade union and worker 
organizations; the environmentally conscious ones will have larger green and ecology 
groups; those with more individualist and materialistic cultures will have stronger 
consumer and occupational groups. If each country combines such characteristics in 
different proportions then their relative rates of participation in different kinds of voluntary 
associations will vary and each country will have its own unique pattern.  
Table 4, organized in the same way as the previous percentage tables, shows the 
percentage of the population in each country involved in any of the four ways in each of 
the 11 kinds of voluntary associations. It shows that a country’s relative level of 
participation in any one kind of voluntary activity is generally repeated in the others. For 
example, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands at 
the top have rates of participation that are uniformly higher than or at least equal to the 
  
Table 4: Participation in twelve kinds of voluntary associations, by country (percentages)
Type of association Country 
Sport      Cultural Religious Consumer Trade
union 
Humani-
tarian 
Social 
club 
Environ-
mental 
Business Science Political
N 
Norway              44 30 21 33 49 37 27 9 16 11 10 2,036
Austria  36            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
              
             
29 41 34 24 24 25 30 12 16 16 2,257
Sweden  50 30 19 38 56 33 22 14 10 14 10 1,999
Denmark  41 31 29 18 66 25 20 16 16 9 7 1,506
Germany  38 24 25 29 15 21 18 15 9 9 6 2,919
Finland  38 26 35 5 49 21 14 8 15 11 8 2,000
Netherlands  56 25 32 32 23 25 12 34 15 14 6 2,364
Belgium  42 33 13 11 30 21 28 19 13 16 9 1,899
UK 36 25 21 33 17 14 21 17 15 13 4 2,052
Israel  28 25 11 27 18 11 19 9 10 15 12 2,499
Luxemburg 34 30 9 50 27 17 23 21 16 9 10 1,552
Ireland  46 28 37 12 24 16 24 14 20 13 11 2,046
France  32 28 11 6 11 15 14 10 4 11 3 1,503
Slovenia  24 14 13 10 22 15 18 3 10 7 5 1,519
Spain  19 17 11 5 8 11 11 6 6 11 5 1,729
Portugal  13 6 12 2 7 7 7 3 4 4 5 1,511
Italy  19 15 11 8 14 15 8 9 13 5 6 1,207
Poland  6 5 7 1 7 4 3 3 2 4 3 2,110
Hungary  10 9 9 3 7 3 8 2 5 5 2 1,685
Greece 5 6 2 1 6 2 4 2 5 4 4 2,566
Average 29 21 17 16 16 15 14 12 9 9 5 42,359
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average in 8 of the 11 kinds of voluntary associations. In most cases their participation 
rates are even appreciably higher than the average. At the other extreme, the bottom seven 
countries have rates of participation that are lower than average in 73 out of 84 cases 
(political association are an exception). Contrary to the idea that each country has its own 
profile of voluntary association activity, Table 4 shows that each has relatively similar 
rates of participation across all 11 types of voluntary activity. Once again, there are few 
exceptions to the rule, but a general pattern becomes clear. 
Social and Helping Behavior 
The extent to which populations socialize with one another and help each other in an 
informal and personal manner might be expected to vary, for example, with different social 
and economic conditions. For example, informal socializing is often said to suffer as a 
result of the social and economic pressures of modern, urban life: big cities are said to be 
societies of strangers compared with the more intense and vibrant community life of small 
towns and rural areas. Helping others in a private and personal way may be more common 
in the close-knit communities of friends, relatives, and neighbors in small towns and 
villages, compared with more anomic, mobile, and heterogeneous cities that may rely more 
on the public welfare agencies of the state and on private or semi-private welfare 
associations. Similarly, as Habermas (1989) has argued, it may be that private helping 
behavior is crowded out by the welfare state which has, he claims, colonized civil society 
and undermined natural forms of solidarity. Wolfe (1989) also claims that the welfare state 
undermines the moral strength of both intimate and distant social ties. In other words, 
large-scale societies and advanced welfare states may have comparatively little informal 
socializing and helping behavior, compared with small-scale societies and less advanced 
welfare states, which can rely less on state welfare and private welfare organizations and 
more on informal, personal contacts. 
The first two columns of Table 5 compare participation in formally organized social 
clubs with the frequency of meeting socially with friends, relatives, and work colleagues. 
The figures show, as one might expect, that informal social meeting is much more frequent 
than formal associational membership, and they also show that formal and informal 
socializing are not alternative modes of social participation, but mutually complementary 
ones.  
The last two columns of Table 5 compare activity in formally organized welfare, aid, 
and humanitarian associations with informal helping behavior. The latter is far more 
common than the former, as one might expect, but the two sets of figures tend to decline 
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together within the columns, suggesting that organized welfare and aid does not drive out 
personal helping behavior. On the contrary, formal and informal help are positively 
associated. Nor does the welfare state drive out either informal social ties or informal 
helping activity, for it is evident that the advanced welfare states of northern Europe have 
the highest rates of informal helping and socializing activity as well as the highest rates of 
voluntary association activity (Table 4). Once again, participation levels in countries are 
generally cumulative and unidimensional so far as social participation and helping 
behavior are concerned. However, because there is only one measure of social participation 
and one for helping behavior in the survey and they share an informal and personal nature, 
the two measures are combined to form a single indicator of social and helping behavior 
for the following detailed empirical analysis.  
 
Table 5: Formal and informal types of social and helping behavior by country 
(percentages) 
Social Helping  Country 
Formal 
social club 
Informal 
social contacts 
Formal humani-
tarian association
Informal 
helping 
 
N 
Norway 27 98 37 66 2,036 
Austria 25 92 24 81 2,257 
Sweden 22 97 33 67 1,999 
Denmark 20 98 25 72 1,506 
Germany 18 94 21 78 2,919 
Finland 14 95 21 54 2,000 
Netherlands 12 96 25 76 2,364 
Belgium 29 93 21 71 1,899 
United Kingdom 21 92 14 61 2,052 
Israel 19 94 11 68 2,499 
Luxembourg 23 91 17 58 1,552 
Ireland 24 92 16 58 2,046 
France 14 95 15 55 1,503 
Slovenia 18 87 15 74 1,519 
Spain 11 92 11 44 1,729 
Portugal 7 90 7 67 1,511 
Italy 8 87 15 44 1,207 
Poland 3 84 3 52 2,110 
Hungary 8 69 3 61 1,685 
Greece 4 77 2 55 2,566 
Switzerland  – 97 – 85 2,040 
Czech Republic  – 86 – 40 1,360 
Average  14 91 15 59 42,359 
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Overall Participation  
Does each of the countries display a tendency towards relatively consistent levels of 
participation across each of the measures compared to other countries? This is to expect a 
great deal, because the study covers 24 kinds of participation in 22 (20, in the case of 
voluntary association activity) countries with different histories, institutions, and cultures. 
Nevertheless, the simple correlations in Table 6 show that 22 of the 24 measures of 
participation vary together – i.e. they are positively correlated. This means, of course, that 
if participation is comparatively high on one measure of participation it is most generally 
high on the others as well. And if the score on any one measure is low it is, pari passu, 
generally low on the others. Moreover, in spite of the small number of observations, the 
great majority are statistically significant at the 5% level of probability, and of those that 
are not statistically significant, a large majority are .30 or greater. Once again, the two 
exceptions are voting and lawful demonstration, where none of the correlations are 
statistically significant, and where, almost uniquely in the table, some of them are negative, 
especially for lawful demonstration.  
To reinforce the point, Figure 1 presents a hierarchical cluster analysis of the 24 
participation measures. The higher the number on the x-axis, the more dissimilar are the 
objects or, in this case, variables within formed clusters. The figure shows, first, that 
widely different forms of participation cluster together. For example, membership of 
consumer associations pairs most closely with political donations, helping others pairs 
most closely with interest in politics, social meeting with signing petitions. A bigger 
cluster groups membership of different kinds of association with donating money to 
political organizations, another groups religious and environmental associations, helping 
others and discussion of and interest in politics, and a third groups informal social contacts 
with signing petitions, boycotting products and membership of humanitarian organizations. 
In other words the clusters do not follow the a priori categories of participation used in 
Tables 2−5, but jumble them up in a more or less random fashion, showing how closely 
associated are different kinds of social and political participation. Once again, Figure 1 
shows that voting and lawful demonstrations are outliers that join the other measures at a 
low level of similarity. As already shown in the correlation matrix, lawful demonstration 
stands the furthest apart from other forms of participation.  
The evidence presented so far uses different statistical techniques (percentages, 
correlations, and cluster analysis) but all of it points to the same conclusion. Rather then 
being fragmented, multidimensional, and noncumulative, as it is at the individual level, 
social and political participation at the national level are systematically patterned, 
cumulative, and unidimensional. Tables 2−5 show that countries repeat their levels of 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation Matrix of 24 Participation Indicators 
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Sports association .76** .86** 1 0 
Culture .88** .80** .89** 1 0 
Consumer association .66** 
 
.65** .66** .66** 1.0 
Religious or church .47* .58** .70** .57** .34 1.0 
Trade union .58** 
 
.80** .67** .67** .42 .50* 1.  
Environmental association .54* .56** .75** .68** .70** .64** .30 1.0 
Business association .70** .62** .75** .72** .54* .64**
 
.62**
 
.56** 1 0 
Science association .81** .60** .77** .87** .70** .46* .41 .72** .61** 1.0 
Political association .72** .56* .53* .65** .57** .53* .48* .53* .59**
 
.72** 1.0 
Social meeting .60** 
 
.76** .78**
 
.75**
 
.51* .53* .59**
 
.52* .51* .63** .48* 1.0 
 Help others .50* .44* .38 .38 .47* 
 
.47* 
 
.30 .54* .21 .34 .41 .31 1.0 
Displayed campaign material .44 .56* .50* .50* .23 .28 .44 −.01 .36 .40 .38 .56* 
 
−.13
 
 1.0 
Contacted politician .61** 
 
.41 .68** .68** .30 .58** .62**
 
.30 .70**
 
.50* .48* 
 
.39 .07 .64** 1.0 
Interested in politics .48* .53* .66** .56** .63** .59**
 
.48*
 
.63**
 
.42 .48* 
 
.42 .43 .77**
 
.07 .22 1.0 
Voted in last election .12 .40 .26 .20 −.00  .32 .44 .21 .21 .01 .22 .08 .35 .20 .10 .30 1.0
Donated to politicians .69** .47* .51* 
 
.61**
 
.70**
 
.37 .39 .52* 
 
.58**
 
.66**
 
.70** .52* .39 .27 .35 .50* 
 
−.22
 
 1.0
 
 
Worked politically .52*  .45* .24 .40 .31 .30 .21 .27 .15 .44 .67**
 
.34 .31 .53* 
 
.35 .11 .27 .38 1.0      
Discuss politics .35 .51* .46* .49* .46* .49* 
 
.46* .34 .16 .32 .32 .44 .56* 
 
.35 .33 .74**
 
.05 .46* 
 
.26 1.0     
Signed petition .78** 
 
.77** .81** .88** .63** .43 .55* .54* 
 
.54* .75** .41 .76** .20 .57**
 
.57** .38 .08 .44 .34 .35 1.0
Boycott products .55* .64**
 
.65**
 
.74**
 
.53* 
 
.49* .60** .39 .38 .55* 
 
.35 .62** 
 
.25 .51*
 
.58**
 
.53* .21 .26 .23 .58**
 
.82**
 
1.0
Lawful demonstration .28 .12 .10 .38 .30 −.18 −.07 .18 .06 .37 .22 .28 −.23
 
.18 .05 −.20 −.19 .23 .27 .01 .41 .21 1.0
Bought ethical products .64** .80** .80** .81** .62** .58** .80** .49* .52* .60** .42 .67** .38 .44* .62** .64** .24 .42 .20 .65** .81** .91** .10 1.0 
Note: N = 20; Pearson (product moment) correlations (two-tailed); * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of 24 Participation Indicators in 20 Countries 
 
participation, relative to each other, across a wide variety of measures. Table 6 shows that 
most of these measures are positively correlated, and are either substantively strong or 
statistically significant in spite of the small number of observations. And Figure 1 shows 
that (with the exception of voting and lawful demonstration) widely different kinds of 
participation cluster together. There is, in other words, an underlying and consistent 
structure to social and political participation, suggesting that participation is participation is 
participation, whether it is social or political, conventional or unconventional, individual or 
organized, private or public, self-regarding or other-regarding, humanitarian or 
materialistic, cultural or sporting, religious or scientific. This is true for 22 of the 24 
measures, but voting and lawful demonstrating are exceptional. Therefore, in the next set 
of tables those two variables are excluded, while noting carefully that they are different 
from the general pattern of participation.  
Given the unidimensional and cumulative nature of 22 measures, it is reasonable to 
create a single indicator of participation in order to compare countries. This is done in 
Table 7. In order not to give undue weight to widespread forms of participation (voting, for 
example, averages 79% across all countries) and too little to minority activities (working 
for a party or political organization averages 4%), the scores are standardized by 
subtracting each country score from the mean of all countries and then dividing by the 
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standard deviation of the measure (z-transformation). The sum of the resulting figures for 
all participation measures provides a single, overall score for each country. It is this score 
that has been used to give shape and understanding to the percentage tables reported so far 
in the paper—so the country ranking of Table 7 is the same (minus Switzerland and the 
Czech Republic) as that of all the previous percentage tables. Norway, Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, and Finland are at the top, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Poland, 
Hungary, and Greece are at the bottom, and the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Israel, 
Luxemburg, Ireland, and France are in the middle. To underscore the point that 
participation at the country level is unidimensional and cumulative, Table 7 also produces 
standardized scores for each of the four theoretical sub-types of participation, showing that 
they follow the country rankings for general participation fairly closely. In short, there is a 
great deal of cross-national consistency in participation levels in general and in respect of 
particular sub-types.  
 
Table 7: Average Standardized Participation Scores for 20 Countries 
Rank Country Participation 
(total) 
Voluntary 
associations 
Social and helping 
behavior 
Conventional 
political activity 
Protest 
activity 
1 Norway 0.95 0.88 0.63 1.56 0.72 
2 Austria 0.90 1.09 0.98 1.07 0.45 
 Sweden 0.90 0.86 0.62 0.27 1.83 
4 Denmark 0.70 0.67 0.94 0.38 0.86 
5 Germany 0.56 0.14 0.92 0.27 0.93 
6 Finland 0.42 0.38 −0.15 0.61 0.83 
7 The Netherlands 0.39 0.75 0.98 0.01 −0.19 
8 Belgium 0.35 0.60 0.53 0.02 0.26 
9 United Kingdom 0.33 0.25 −0.00 0.02 1.04 
10 Israel 0.23 0.14 0.48 0.64 −0.32 
 Luxemburg 0.23 0.67 −0.25 0.21 0.29 
 Ireland 0.23 0.67 −0.10 0.28 0.05 
13 France 0.08 −0.42 −0.08 −0.00 0.81 
14 Slovenia −0.50 −0.44 0.23 −0.72 −1.06 
15 Spain −0.66 −0.62 −0.75 −0.70 −0.56 
16 Portugal −0.73 −1.14 0.18 −0.62 −1.32 
17 Italy −0.91 −0.57 −1.15 −1.02 −0.89 
18 Poland −1.06 −1.39 −1.00 −0.61 −1.26 
19 Hungary −1.18 −1.18 −1.61 −0.64 −1.27 
20 Greece −1.23 −1.33 −1.36 −1.00 −1.21 
Note: Figures are the averages of standardized indicators and a higher value indicates more participation. The countries 
are sorted by the overall participation scores. The two deviant types of participation (voting and lawful demonstrating) 
are not included in the calculations.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious point to emerge from Table 7 is that country families with 
common borders or strong historical and cultural connections often have similar levels of 
participation.  
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1. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland fill four of the top six places, ranking 1st, 2nd, 
4th, and 6th respectively. 
2. Austria and Germany12 rank 2nd and 5th.  
3. The Benelux countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg rank 7th, 8th, and 
10th. 
4. The UK and Ireland are 9th and 10th in the table.  
5. The Mediterranean nations of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France are grouped in 
the bottom eight of the Table.  
6. The remaining countries at the bottom eight are ex-communist countries, namely 
Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia.13  
7. Israel is part of the northern European group, but at the bottom end closest to other 
Mediterranean countries.  
France falls between the northern European and the Mediterranean/Central European 
countries. Though France and Slovenia rank next to each other, their scores are widely 
different suggesting that there is a big gap between the northern countries and those in the 
south and centre, with France closer to the northern than to the southern group. 
Explaining National Patterns 
The second part of this article seeks to explain the levels of national participation shown 
in Table 7. The task is made easier by the clear and stable pattern of cumulative and 
unidimensional social and political participation and by the existence of country families 
of participation. However, since this is a core empirical claim of the present research it 
was tested again using, this time, a cluster analysis of countries (Figure 2).14 This shows 
a division between two main families of nations – those of the north and those of south 
and central Europe. The first includes Austria, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Israel, Ireland, Luxemburg, Finland, the UK, and France. 
Greece, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Slovenia form a second group of 
countries. The northern group is, in turn, sub-divided into two branches of the main 
family: Austria, Norway, Denmark, Germany and Sweden in the first, and Belgium, the 
                                                 
12  The German figures are pulled down somewhat by the inclusion of East Germany. West Germany has a 
figure much closer to Austria’s. It is also clear from Tables 2, 4, and 5 that Austria and Switzerland are 
closely alike. 
13  It is clear from Tables 2, 4, and 5 that the Czech Republic also falls in the bottom third on most of the 
measures available. 
14  The cluster analysis is based on the four sub-types “Conventional Political Participation”, “Unconventional 
Politics”, “Participation in Voluntary Associations”, and “Social and Helping Behavior.”  
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Netherlands, Ireland, Israel, Luxemburg, Finland, the UK, and France in the second. As 
in Table 7, the cluster analysis shows that countries with contiguous borders and a 
common historical and cultural background are closely similar in their participation 
levels—the Scandinavian nations, Benelux countries, Germany and Austria, the UK and 
Ireland, and so on.  
These families of nations are similar to those of research on public policy (Castles 1993; 
Castles and Obinger 2008; Obinger and Wagschal 2001) showing a set of five country 
families that are persistent over time.  
The fact that participation country families largely coincide with those for public policy 
suggests not just families of nations on single characteristics, but family resemblances over 
a variety of characteristics. And if the same country families appear on public policy and 
participation, then it is possible that they will appear on other dimensions as well—party 
systems, formal institutions of government, political culture, religion, national values, and 
so on.15  
 
Figure 2: Patterns of Participation 
Note: Dendrogram using Complete Linkage Method and Euclidean Distances.  
                                                 
15  Existing deviations can, for example, depend on the countries included into the analysis. Cluster 
analysis, especially in the context of small- or medium-N studies, is highly sensitive to inclusion or 
exclusion of cases.  
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Rather little country-level research on social and political participation has been 
completed, but it is possible to identify some general theoretical approaches towards an 
explanation of the cross-national patterns that have emerged. They revolve around 
political, economic, legal, and social development determinants, and, although they mix 
and overlap in real life, it is possible to distinguish between them for theoretical purposes.  
Political Theories 
1. Democratic Development and Stability  
Democracy is designed to integrate citizens into the political system and to encourage at 
least some forms of mass participation in politics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 17−23). It is 
also associated with participation in social life, for the benefits of personal development 
and the free expression of individual interests. Based on the principles of freedom of 
thought, speech, and association, democracy creates an institutional framework and a 
culture of trust (Delhey and Newton 2005) that promotes individual participation of many 
kinds, not least in the voluntary associations that are an integral part of civil society. 
Democracy also limits the capacity for arbitrary and discriminatory action by private and 
public actors, so making participation more attractive and less risky. It helps to create a 
structure of opportunities for participation of diverse kinds, not just conventional political 
participation (Kitschelt 1986), and a culture that favors free and equal participation in 
society and its politics. Conversely, risk and unpredictability in social and political life 
were barrier major problems for participation in the communist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Mishler and Rose 1997; Stzompka 1996). Democratic stability encourages 
participation by making the social and political world more predictable and less threatening 
and by making it easier to plan and organize for the future.  
The measures of democracy and stability used in this study are:16
- The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index: the higher the score, the more 
democratic the country; 
- Political stability which is a composite measure provided by the World Bank covering 
ethnic tension, internal conflict, constitutional changes, military coups, political 
fragmentation of parties and groups, social unrest, terrorist threats, and armed conflict. 
The scale is fixed with a maximum of +2.5 for the greatest government stability, and a 
minimum of –2.5. 
                                                 
16  For more detailed information on the measures see Delhey and Newton (2004: 30−34).  
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2. Good Government 
By good government is meant a set of institutional mechanisms, procedures, and outcomes 
that maintain equality of the rights and duties of citizens, impartial and effective public 
bureaucracies, political and social stability, and an absence of violence and corruption. It is 
closely associated with democracy but not identical with it. Good government also seems 
to be closely associated with social trust and reciprocity, which, in turn, are the basis of 
close and constant interaction between citizens (Delhey and Newton 2005). Good 
government may also help to set a social and political framework that encourages citizen 
competence, a community of citizens with common interests, and a collective sense that 
participation in public and private affairs is worthwhile and effective and will not result in 
violence or be undermined by corruption.  
Measures of good government are:  
- Government effectiveness which is a World Bank measure covering bureaucratic 
quality, transaction costs, quality of public health care, and government stability. The 
scale is from +2.5 (greatest effectiveness) to –2.5 (least effective); 
- Corruption is provided by Transparency International; the higher the score, the less the 
corruption. 
3. Personal Public Services  
It might be argued that high levels of personal public services will have a direct and 
indirect impact on social and political involvement. The more governments tax their 
populations in order to provide services, the more citizens will be inclined to become 
politically involved in order to influence public policies. And the more governments 
provide public services, especially health and education, and the better educated and 
healthier their populations are, the more resources citizens will have that enable them to 
participate effectively. A high level of personal public services might also help to create a 
sense of shared identity, common purpose, and social equality that express themselves in 
closer and more co-operation social involvement. Alternatively, it might be argued as 
Habermas and Wolfe have (see above) that the welfare state is a destroyer of close social 
ties and personal help and support for others.  
The measures of personal public services used here are:  
- Public expenditures on health and education as a percentage of GDP (provided by the 
UNDP’s Human Development Report).  
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Legal Theory 
The rule of law, essential for democracy and equality of citizenship, makes participation 
and collective action more risk free by minimizing the arbitrary action of the state and 
private individuals. It also helps to produce a stable social order that makes the processes 
and consequences of participation more predictable and less threatening. It guarantees 
freedoms and allows individuals to follow their interests and act as they wish within the 
broad limits of the law. Absence of the rule of law in totalitarian and less-developed 
countries is associated with suspicion, alienation, low trust, and corruption, all of which 
make it difficult or dangerous to co-operate and become involved with others. The two 
legal measures employed here are: 
- Law and order. Produced by the Political Risk Services, the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) covers legal impartiality and popular observe of the law as judged by 
country expert opinion; the higher the score, the better the law and order of the country;  
- Rule of law which is a composite measure provided by the World Bank covering the 
extent of black markets, enforceability of private and government contracts, corruption 
in banking, crime, and theft as obstacles to business, losses from and costs of crime, 
and the unpredictability of the judiciary. The scale has a maximum of +2.5 (greatest 
rule of law) and a minimum of –2.5 (least rule of law).  
Economic Theory 
Economic resources, in one form or another, are crucial determinants of levels and types of 
participation from voting turnout and party choice to involvement in voluntary associations 
and involvement in social and cultural affairs (Schlozman 2002; van Deth and Elff 2004; 
Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Weßels 1997). The wealthier the society 
the higher its levels of participation in particular kinds of activities, especially those 
concerned with the production of collective goods (Olson 1982) and those of a non-
materialist, self-development, and self-expressive kind that revolve around local 
communities and new social movements (Inglehart 1997). Income inequality, on the other 
hand, may have the effect of depressing levels of participation to the extent that it is 
associated with marginalized and excluded minorities (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) and 
with low levels of social trust that inhibit free participation (Delhey and Newton 2005). 
The measures of wealth and inequality used here are:  
- GDP per capita (Human Development report); 
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- Gini Index on income inequality (Human Development Report); 
- Life expectancy (Human Development Report).  
Modernization Theories 
Conflicting opinions about the impact of modernization on participation correspond 
roughly with the different views of Simmel (1950) and Tönnies (1963). One theory argues 
modern societies will have higher rates of participation across a wide spectrum of activities 
because of their greater resources, higher levels of education, larger populations, greater 
social differentiation, better communications, and a more complex social structure of 
overlapping and interlocking social groups and organizations (Bell 1973; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Roller and Weßels 1996; Weßels 1997). Others equate modernization with 
bureaucracy, centralization, alienation, privatization, atomization, anomie, materialism, 
individualism, and increasing social isolation, which result in lower levels of social 
involvement and civic engagement. Similarly, modernization in the form of large-scale 
post-industrial and urban society is claimed to have contradictory effects, one theory 
arguing that the increasingly anonymous, individualistic, materialistic, TV dominated, and 
impersonal life in the city undermines the sense of community and common purpose, the 
other claiming that the sheer scale and the increasingly heterogeneous, multi-cultural, and 
vibrant nature of the modern city encourage social interaction and new forms of urban 
involvement. Our measures of modernization are:  
- Population size and density, degree of urbanization, size of agricultural sector (United 
Nations Demographic Yearbook; Human Development Report; OECD Labour Force 
Statistics).  
Fragmented and Divided Societies  
The effects of population size on participation will be strongest where there are no 
divisions separating people into sharply different groups. Participation rates may be lower 
where the population is fragmented and deeply divided, even if it is a large one. According 
to Rokeach (1960: 161) “there is a natural tendency for people to associate with, socialize 
with and be more comfortable with others having similar belief systems” and this is more 
likely to occur in ethically, religiously, nationally linguistically, and culturally similar 
populations. Some studies have found that socially mixed and heterogeneous societies have 
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lower rates of volunteering and voluntary association activity and values and attitudes that do 
not support co-operation and trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 1999; Costa and Kahn 2003; 
Knack and Keefer 1997). The measures of fragmentation and division in this study are:  
- Religious, linguistic, and ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003; World Culture 
Report).  
Education 
Education has often been picked out for its close and special association with many forms 
of social life, not least participation (see, for example, Weßels 1997: 207). It is one of the 
most important individual resources and contributes to the human capital of nations as a 
whole. In this study education is measured by:  
- Secondary education net enrollment ratios (Human Development Report of the 
UNDP). 
It is, of course, the case that although these theories may be distinguished for theoretical 
reasons, they are closely entangled in real life: democratic societies are most generally 
economically developed, marked by stability and low conflict, good government, law and 
order, low corruption, and so on. In real life it may be difficult to separate out the theories 
and their measures and to estimate their independent effects on participation.  
The associations between this set of independent variables and the standardized 
participation scores were estimated by means of simple correlations. The correlations 
(Table 8) show that rates of participation are most closely associated with three groups of 
country characteristics. 
First and foremost is the nature of the social and political order, as measured by the 
indicators of law and order, (the absence of) corruption, and, above all, by the World Bank 
measure of rule of law. The latter shows an extremely close association with the overall 
participation score (r = .90**). The second group of characteristics covers democratic 
effectiveness and stability, particularly the World Bank’s composite measure of 
government effectiveness (.77**) and the EIU’s democracy score (.71**). The third group 
of variables covers national wealth and its consequences, especially GDP per capita 
(.60**), government expenditures on health and education (.56**), as well as life 
expectancy (.55*), which is usually closely associated with health and government 
spending on health and education. The signs for economic equality are negative, as 
hypothesized, but the correlations are well below even the weakest level of significance.  
26 
There is weak evidence that some aspects of modernization are associated with higher 
levels of participation, most notably the size of the agricultural sector which is strongly and 
negatively related (−.69*). However, the three other measures of modernization 
(population size and density, and urbanization) do not seem to be of much importance. 
There is little convincing evidence that population fragmentation or division (including 
economic inequality) matters much and, perhaps more surprisingly, that aggregate 
educational levels have any impact.  
 
Table 8: Simple Correlations between Participation Scores and Country Characteristics 
Variable Participation 
(Total) 
Voluntary 
associations 
Social and 
helping behavior
Conventional 
political 
participation 
Unconventional 
politics 
Social and political order 
Rule of law .90** .90** .70** .77** .84** 
Law and order .75** .81** .61** .62** .64** 
Politics 
Government effectiveness .77** .79** .61** .57** .76** 
EUI democracy index .71** .73** .58** .56** .67** 
Absence of political corruption .87** .80** .75** .80** .78** 
Political stability .35 .37 .26 .20 .41 
Government expenditure 
– on health and education .56** .39 .65** .50* .48* 
– on health .46* .31 .59 ** .36 .40 
– on education .51* .37 .55* .50* .43 
Economy 
GDP per capita .60** .71** .40 .49* .54* 
Life expectancy .55* .54* .45* .37 .57** 
Economic equality −.28 −.32 −.11 −.31 −.28 
Divided society, education, and modernization 
Linguistic fractionalization .24 .37 .29 .13 .09 
Religious fractionalization .13 .09 .19 .01 .17 
Ethnic fractionalization −.05 .09 −.07 −.09 −.09 
Education .34 .24 .35 .18 .39 
Population density .08 .14 .28 −.07 −.07 
Population size −.13 −.27 −.13 −.26 −.12 
Urbanization .32 .33 .13 .19 .47* 
Size of agricultural sector −.69** −.73** −.52* −.50* −.67** 
Note: N = 20; Pearson (product moment) correlations (two-tailed); * = p < .05 and ** = p < .01. 
 
To check the reliability and robustness of these results, and to ensure that we have not 
over-interpreted the single measure of participation in general, additionally, separate sets 
of correlations were run between the country descriptors and the four sub-types of 
participation. The results shown in Table 8 are much the same for each sub-type as they are 
for overall participation. In short, participation of different kinds and the overall 
participation scores are closely associated with the same set of independent variables, 
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showing once again that each country has a similar level of participation of different types 
and that these are correlated with the same explanatory variables.  
This claim might be tested more thoroughly with regression analysis, but this is not 
possible for two reasons. First, with only 20 countries it is not possible to test a large 
number of independent variables simultaneously. Second, many of the independent 
variables most closely correlated with participation are themselves closely inter-correlated 
and cannot be entered into the same regression. For example, rule of law is, as expected, an 
integral component of a tight-knit wider syndrome of powerful variables. Instead of 
regression analysis, another approach which triangulates on participation and its correlates 
is used, taking the three main clusters of countries shown in Figure 2 and testing whether 
these vary systematically according to the independent variables most closely associated 
with participation. In other words, do countries that cluster on measures of participation 
differ systematically in respect of the independent variables that seem best to explain the 
level of participation?  
The figures in Table 9 show that they do differ significantly in this respect so far as rule 
of law, absence of corruption, law and order, government effectiveness, democracy, and 
GDP per capita are concerned. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-tests show whether a 
country group is significantly different from another with respect to the country 
descriptors. The country clusters are significantly different with respect to the precise 
variables most closely associated with the level of participation. Therefore, the table 
supports the overall validity of the cluster solution because it shows significant and 
systematic differences between the country clusters and the exogenous variables most 
closely associated with them (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1985: 66). At the same time, 
those results emphasize the importance of those variables in the general context of political 
and social participation.  
Conclusions 
The results presented in this paper suggest three main conclusions about patterns of social 
and political participation at the country level. First, participation is participation is 
participation: what ever may happen at the individual level in terms of its non-cumulative, 
fragmented, and specialized nature in political life, social and political participation at the 
country level are cumulative and not specialized or fragmented. Country profiles of 
participation are all of a piece insofar as each nation maintains a consistent level of 
involvement over a wide range of measures compared with the other countries. Second, the 
more the more: countries with a greater depth of involvement on any one kind most usually 
28 
have a greater depth of involvement on the other measures as well. Country profiles of 
participation show a strongly consistent pattern in this respect, with the same countries 
consistently appearing at the top of the European league tables, and conversely the same 
countries appearing at the bottom. This is true of 22 of our 24 measures, but voting turnout, 
and legal and illegal demonstrations are equally clearly deviant cases that do not conform 
to the general pattern.  
 
Table 9: F-Test Statistics and Cluster Centers 
Variable Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Social and political order 
Rule of law** 1.71 1.50 0.80 
Law and order** 5.80 5.63 4.43 
Politics 
Government effectiveness** 1.53 1.50 0.77 
EUI democracy index** 9.29 8.58 7.88 
Absence of political corruption** 8.64 8.10 5.10 
Political stability 1.30 1.04 0.91 
Government expenditure 
– on health and education* 13.3 11.4 10.3 
– on health 6.70 6.06 5.41 
– on education* 6.64 5.31 4.90 
Economy 
GDP per capita (in 1000)* 26.7 27.7 16.9 
Life expectancy 78.3 78.1 76.1 
Economic equality 28.8 31.8 32.4 
Divided society, education, and modernization 
Linguistic fractionalization 0.14 0.32 0.12 
Religious fractionalization 0.35 0.36 0.29 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.10 0.25 0.18 
Education 91.4 89.8 87.9 
Population Density 253 535 294 
Population Size 22.0 20.3 24.4 
Urbanization 74.0 77.8 62.6 
Size of agricultural sector** 3.42 3.26 9.86 
Note: N = 20; values are cluster centers by variable; * = p < .05 and ** p < .01 using ANOVA F-test . 
 
Third, there are country families of participation, with a clear divide between the countries 
of the Nordic and northern regions of Europe, and those of south and central Europe. 
Within the northern group there are two family branches consisting of the Scandinavian 
and northern countries, and those located in the middle of west Europe that are located 
between the northern and Mediterranean regions. Countries with common borders, 
cultures, and historical ties are often grouped closely together: Norway, Denmark, and 
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Sweden; Austria and Germany (and probably Switzerland); the Benelux countries; the UK 
and Ireland; the Mediterranean nations; and central-European countries. Moreover, these 
country families coincide to a substantial degree with those revealed by studies in other 
areas, suggesting that country families may be similar in other respects yet to be explored.  
The strength and consistency of the participation patterns makes the job of explaining 
them easier. Country levels of participation are best explained by three sorts of factors. The 
first and strongest is the social and political framework set by the rule of law, law and order, 
and low levels of corruption. The second consists of the political configuration of 
government effectiveness, democracy, spending on public personal services, and (to a lesser 
extent) political stability. The third involves the economic variables of wealth and their 
correlate, life expectation. The theory that focuses on modernization fares less well, although 
there is a strong and significant tendency for agricultural societies to have low levels of 
participation, and similarly education and population fragmentation have little impact.  
Two important points qualify this simplified summary of the results. Many of the 
explanatory variables are closely interrelated and form a single, indivisible syndrome of 
country characteristics. The rule of law is an integral part of democracy, which is closely 
associated with wealth, political stability, law and order, government effectiveness, 
modernization, and often with high expenditures on personal public services. It is possible, 
if not probable, that each element in this syndrome serves to promote participation both 
directly and indirectly by virtue of their mutually reinforcing effects. In this case, it may be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to untangle the syndrome and isolate the independent 
effects of each component – at least without a much larger number of observations and a 
long-time series. And in this case, it may be that participation’s strongest correlation with 
rule of law may be attributed not to its own direct effects or intrinsic importance in the 
overall combination of factors, but to the fact that it happens to be the best single indicator 
in this work of a large and complex array of interrelated and interdependent variables that 
encourage participation.  
This also means that it is extremely difficult to sort out cause and effect relations when it 
is possible, or likely, that many of the variables included in this study operate as both cause 
and effect. People learn to participate by participating, claims Pateman (1988). In the same 
way, the structures and institutions that permit and encourage participation may form a 
mutually reinforcing system that encourages more participation. In the terms used by 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005), rule of law could be a key component of the human 
development sequence that is intimately bound up with human happiness, democracy, 
economic well-being, and participation. To try to unravel such complex cause-and-effect 
relations of this kind is another and exceedingly difficult matter to be researched on 
another occasion. 
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